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鮑曼不動桿菌;
碳青黴烯酶;
感染控制;
OXA-51;
OXA-72metallo-beta-lactamases, imipenemases, and oxacillinases (OXA). Our measures to control the
outbreak included private room isolation of patients until there were three successive negative
cultures, reinforcement of contact precautions, daily environmental cleansing with room-
dedicated cleaning tools and sodium hypochlorite, and careful auditing of adherence. During
the outbreak, 32 clinical XDRAb isolates came from 13 patients who were hospitalized in four
intensive care units and three wards. Most (7 of 13, 53.8%) cases were associated with a surgical
intensive care unit. The results from pulsed-field gel electrophoresis study indicated that all
isolates were of one genotype. All 32 isolates harbored ISAba1-blaOxA-51-like and blaOxA-72 genes.
After this outbreak till August 2010, further incidences of XDRAb were sporadic cases of XDRAb
with different clones and did not reach the level of outbreak. To our knowledge, this is the first
reported hospital-wide outbreak caused by OXA-72 carbapenemaseeproducing A baumannii in
the Asia-Pacific region, with successful and sustained control. Although the source or vehicle
of the outbreak was not identified, our results suggest that a hospital-wide outbreak can be
successfully managed with strict infection control measures, and that the limitation of the use
of carbapenems and closure of wards may not be necessary.
摘要 有效處理廣泛耐藥鮑曼不動桿菌(extensively drug-resistant Acinetobacter baumannii,
XDRAb)群突發仍是許多醫院之難題。台灣某醫學中心於2006年一至二月，發生一起XDRAb多病房
群突發，在未限制carbapenems使用及不關病房下，落實易執行之感控措施，有效控制該群突
發。本研究分析該群突發之分子流行病學並分享成功經驗。XDRAb定義為除了tigecycline及poly-
myxin B外，對多種抗生素具抗藥性之A baumannii。群突發期間同時收集病患及其病室環境之
XDRAb進行抗生素感受性試驗及脈衝場凝膠電泳，並進行VIM、IMP metallo-beta-lactamases及
OXA carbapenemase之聚合酶鏈鎖反應與定序。感染控制措施包括：單人病室隔離、隔離至連續
三套追蹤培養陰性、加強接觸防護、每日以病室專用器具及次氯酸鈉清潔消毒，並確實監督措施
遵從性。群突發期間，於四個加護病房及三個一般病房共13位住院病人採檢到32株XDRAb。其中7
位病人(53.8%) 與外科加護病房有關。分子分型及基因定序確認這32株皆帶ISAba1-blaOxA-51-like及
blaOxA-72抗藥基因，證明此群突發為攜有OXA-72及前置ISAba1之類OXA-51 carbapenemase的同
型XDRAb散布7個病房。經感控措施確實執行，在未限制carbapenems使用及不關病房下，後續
追蹤迄今，無新的群突發。本文報告亞太區首例由產生OXA-72之XDRAb引發的醫院跨病房群突
發。雖未找出傳播來源或載體，但顯示在未限制carbapenems使用及不關閉病房下，落實感染控
制措施亦可成功遏止全院XDRAb之群突發。
Copyright ª 2011, Elsevier Taiwan LLC. All rights reserved.Introduction
Acinetobacter baumannii exists widely in the hospital
environment [1], and it can cause serious or fatal illnesses,
particularly in immunocompromised patients. Multiple
drug-resistant A baumannii, which is only susceptible to
a limited number of antibiotics, has also been increasingly
reported worldwide [2]. The emergence of extensively drug-
resistant A baumannii (XDRAb)ddefined as A baumannii
that is resistant to multiple antibiotics but susceptible to
tigecycline and polymyxin Bdhas recently become a major
problem worldwide [3]. When a nosocomial outbreak of
XDRAb occurs, the health and lives of hospitalized patients
are seriously threatened [4,5]. In Taiwan, there have been
outbreaks of multidrug-resistant A baumannii (MDRAb) that
is resistant to more than three classes of antimicrobial
agents [6e9]. However, simple and effective infection
control measures without the closure of wards or hospitals
are preferred to limit the spread of XDRAb in hospital
settings.
It could take several months to control XDRAb outbreaks,
even with the implementation of infection control measures
[10e12]. Infection control measures usually include closure
of intensive care units (ICUs) or wards, especially when the
source or reservoir is not found [11e15]. Here, we report
the first documented hospital-wide outbreak of XDRAbcarrying oxacillinase (OXA)-72 carbapenemase in the Asia-
Pacific region, focusing on its infection control measures
and molecular epidemiology.
Materials and methods
Hospital setting and patient characteristics
Kaohsiung Medical University Hospital is a 1,600-bed
tertiary medical center in southern Taiwan. There are 10
ICUs, one respiratory care center (RCC), and 37 wards.
Clinical data, including patient age, gender, days in the
hospital, days in the ICU, site(s) of infection, time from
admission to XDRAb acquisition, medical comorbidities, and
major risk factors (e.g. drain tubes, mechanical ventilation)
were recorded for each patient from whom XDRAb was
isolated during January and February 2006 (Table 1). Acute
Physiology and Chronic Health Evaluation II (APACHE II)
scores were calculated at the time of XDRAb isolation.
XDRAb was considered to be the cause of pneumonia when
there was clinical and radiological evidence of lower respi-
ratory tract involvement [16]. XDRAb-attributable mortality
was determined by subtracting the crude mortality rate of
patients with colonization from the crude mortality rate of
patients with infection [17]. We defined colonization as the
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Acinetobacter baumannii with OXA-72 outbreak 209presence of bacteria without clinically relevant signs of
illness and infection as the presence of bacteria with clini-
cally relevant signs of illness. The study was performed after
approval by the hospital’s Institutional Review Board.
Bacterial isolates
Clinical XDRAb isolates from all 13 hospitalized patients and
environmental isolates from surveillance cultures of these
patients’ immediate environments (including bedrails,
monitors, respirators, bedside desks, and bedside sinks)
were collected. The hands of personnel taking care of these
patients were randomly sampled with a cotton swab
moistened with brain heart infusion (BHI) broth during the
work time before washing hands [1]. Bacterial identifica-
tion was performed by conventional methods, using the API
20NE system (bioMe´rieux, Marcy l’Etoile, France) and recA
gene sequencing [18]. Acinetobacter baumannii ATCC
19606 was used as a control strain.
Antimicrobial susceptibility testing
We used the disk diffusion method, as described by the
Clinical and Laboratory Standards Institute [19], to determine
the antibiotic susceptibility for the following antibiotics:
amikacin, amoxicillin/clavulanic acid, ampicillin/sulbactam,
piperacillin, piperacillin/tazobactam, ticarcillin/clavulanic
acid, aztreonam, cefotaxime, ceftazidime, ceftriaxone,
cefepime, imipenem, meropenem, chloramphenicol, cipro-
floxacin, levofloxacin, ofloxacin, gentamicin, tobramycin,
and trimethoprim/sulfamethoxazole. The minimal inhibition
concentrations (MICs) of tigecycline and polymyxin B were
determined by the Etest (AB Biodisk, Solna, Sweden).
Molecular typing with pulsed-field gel
electrophoresis
Pulsed-field gel electrophoresis (PFGE) was performed as
previously described [20]. ApaI (New England Biolabs,
Beverly, MA, USA)erestricted fragments were separated by
PFGE in 1% SeaKem Gold agarose gels (Cambres Bio Science,
Rockland, ME, USA) using a Bio-Rad CHEF-Mapper apparatus
(Bio-Rad Laboratories, Richmond, CA, USA). Band patterns
were compared and classified following the criteria of
Tenover et al. [21].
Polymerase chain reaction amplification and gene
sequencing
Isolates were grown overnight on BHI agar plates at 37C,
and lysis was achieved by heating for 10 minutes at 95C.
The lysed cells were used on the day of preparation without
exception. Polymerase chain reaction (PCR) testing of the
clinical isolates for carbapenemase-encoding genes was
performed using primers for OXA, imipenemase (IMP), and
Verona integron-encoded metallo-beta-lactamase (VIM)
carbapenemase groups [22e25]. For OXA and VIM, the cycle
conditions were as follows: initial denaturation at 95C for
5 minutes; 30 cycles of amplification steps at 95C for 30
seconds, 52C for 30 seconds, 72C for 45 seconds; and
210 W.-R. Lin et al.a final extension at 72C for 7 minutes. For IMP, the cycle
conditions were as follows: initial denaturation at 95C for
5 minutes; 30 cycles of amplification steps at 95C for 30
seconds, 50C for 30 seconds, 72C for 1 minute; and a final
extension at 72C for 7 minutes. Primers P1 and P2 were
used for sequence analysis of the blaOxA-24-related gene
[26]. The adjacency of ISAba1 and the blaOxA-51-like gene
was determined with primers ISAba1F and OXA-51-like R
[27].
Infection control measures
The following intervention measures were implemented to
control this outbreak: (1) isolation of patients in private
rooms (or private spaces when single rooms were not
available); (2) requirements and audits to assure that
health care workers washed their hands between contacts
with different patients; (3) requirement that health care
workers used separate gloves and gowns for each patient;
and (4) daily cleansing of objects surrounding patients’
beds with a sodium hypochlorite solution and a room-
dedicated cleaning tool. One XDRAb infected/colonized
patient was not removed from a private room or private
space until there were three successive negative cultures in
1 week during the follow-up period [28]. Surveillance
cultures were performed twice per week.
All laboratory technicians notified physicians through
the computer-assistant critical value alert system when
XDRAb was identified from a clinical specimen. If there
were two or more XDRAb cases in the same ward, surveil-
lance of the environment and the health care worker was
done to prevent local spread and outbreak.
Statistical analysis
Continuous variables were compared by an unpaired (two-
sample) Student t test. Categorical variables were compared
by Fisher’s exact test or the Chi-squared test. A p value less
than 0.05 was considered statistically significant.
Results
Epidemiology and patient characteristics
In our hospital, 46,789 patients were hospitalized during
2006, corresponding to 382,341 hospital person-days. A
total of 5,414 patients were discharged from the ICUs,
corresponding to 36,468 ICU person-days, and 261 patients
were discharged from the RCC, corresponding to 5,730 RCC
person-days. There had been no clinical isolate of XDRAb
before 2006. We did not restrict carbapenem use during or
after the outbreak. Meropenem was the only carbapenem
used in our hospital from November 2001 to December
2008. The consumption of meropenem, recorded as defined
daily dose, varied monthly among 15e30 defined daily
dose/1,000 person-days, and there was no evident trend
during 2005e2006. There were 13 XDRAb cases during the
outbreak period (January and February of 2006, Fig. 1).
After the outbreak ceased, only six additional sporadic
cases were observed in the subsequent 10 months (Fig. 2).Two of these sporadic cases occurred in different rooms of
the RCC in March and April 2006, and the other four cases
occurred in different wards in November and December
2006. There were no more outbreaks during the period
when our infection control measures were implemented.
In 2006, there were a total of 19 XDRAb cases, corre-
sponding to an incidence of 0.04% for all hospitalized
patients.
Table 1 summarizes the medical characteristics of the 13
patients infected during the outbreak period. These
patients were originally in diverse hospital wards. Cases 1
and 3 had XDRAb cultured 1e2 days after transfer from
a surgical ICU (SICU). Case 2 had just been transferred to
the cardiovascular ICU from a local hospital. The SICU was
the most commonly involved ward (seven cases, 53.8%).
Among our 13 cases, five had infection and eight had
colonization. The XDRAb isolates from the eight colonized
patients were obtained from sputum specimens. The mean
APACHE II scores of the infected patients were higher than
those of the colonized patients (mean standard devia-
tion: 26 6.8 vs. 21 3.0, respectively; pZ 0.016). There
was no significant difference regarding the underlying
diseases between these two groups.
Four of the five infected patients died within 1 month,
four (50%) of the eight colonized patients died, and two
died within 1 month. Infected patients tended to die sooner
than colonized patients (mean standard deviation:
16 9.6 days vs. 26 20.4 days, respectively, pZ 0.093).
Bacterial isolates and antibiotic susceptibility
A total of 32 XDRAb isolates were recovered from clinical
specimens of 13 patients, and 36 XDRAb isolates were
recovered from 187 environmental samples. Among the
environmental samples, 10 were from the control panel
surface of medical equipments; 19 from surrounding
materials, such as pillows, bedrails, and clothes; five from
the patient’s axilla; and two from the patient’s anus. No
XDRAb isolates were recovered from 46 health care workers
(five doctors and 41 nurses).
All A baumannii clinical and environmental isolates were
resistant to the 20 antibiotics and antibiotic combinations
mentioned in the “Materials and methods” (antimicrobial
susceptibility testing) section, but not to both polymyxin
B and tigecycline. Based on the Etest method for tigecy-
cline, the MIC of four isolates was 2 mg/mL or less, and the
MIC of the other 28 XDRAb isolates was 3e6 mg/mL (MIC50:
3 mg/mL; MIC90: 4 mg/mL; range: 1.5e6 mg/mL) [29].
Based on the results of Etest to polymyxin B, all 32
isolates’ MICs were less than or equal to 1 mg/mL (MIC50:
1 mg/mL; MIC90: 1 mg/mL; range: 0.5e1 mg/mL), indicating
susceptibility to polymyxin B.
PFGE and PCR
All 32 clinical isolates had the same ribotype and indistin-
guishable pulsotypes, suggesting that this outbreak was
caused by clonal spread. The PFGE pattern of our isolates
was indistinguishable from, and presumably closely related
to, a pulsotype strain isolated in Taiwan, previously named
“R5 pulsotype” [30]. PCR testing indicated that none of
Figure 1. Hospitalization courses and positive-culture days of all 13 colonized/infected patients in the wards/units. CCUZ
cardiovascular intensive care unit; CSCUZ cardiosurgical intensive care unit; MCU1 and 2Zmedical intensive care units 1 and 2;
NSCUZ neurosurgical intensive care unit; RCCZ respiratory care center; SICUZ surgical intensive care unit; wardsZ including
different wards.
Acinetobacter baumannii with OXA-72 outbreak 211our 32 isolates had the following four genes: blaVIM,
blaIMP, blaOxA-23-like, and blaOxA-58-like. However, all 32
isolates had blaOxA-24-like and blaOxA-51-like genes, and all of
these blaOxA-51-like genes were preceded by ISAba1, indi-
cating hyperproduction of OXA-51 [27].
Sequencing of the blaOxA-24-like gene indicated that it was
identical to A baumannii carbapenem-hydrolyzing beta-
lactamase blaOxA-72 (Genebank accession no. EF534256
and AY739646). The clinical isolates from six additional
sporadic cases in the subsequent months in 2006 had
different pulsotypes, all of which had more than three band
differences.
Infection control measures
We identified the first case (Case 1) when a culture
confirmed the isolation of XDRAb. This was the first instance
of XDRAb in our hospital. Infection control measures, espe-
cially private room isolation, were instituted immediately.
However, XDRAb was subsequently isolated from other
patients.
XDRAb was also present in 36 of 187 (19.3%) environ-
mental surveillance cultures. Furthermore, we found XDRAb
on the control panel surface of an electrocardiogram (ECG)
monitor in the SICU, even after cleaning and disinfection
after transfer of Case 5 (who had XDRAb colonization) from
the SICU to a ward. This led us to institute an intensiveinfection control program. We reinforced the need for
adherence to disinfection protocols and room-dedicated
cleaning tools. After the aforementioned surveillance study
and reinforcement of the need for environmental cleansing,
frequent audits indicated that there was no XDRAb on the
control panel surfaces of the medical equipments.
The use of carbapenem was not restricted because of
the widespread presence of extended-spectrum b-lacta-
mase-producing bacteria in our hospital. Our measures
appeared to control the outbreak successfully, and there
was no need to close any ICU or ward. Only sporadic cases
occurred in the subsequent 10 months.
Discussion
We identified and controlled the first outbreak of XDRAb
that harbored OXA-72 and ISAba1-OXA-51 carbapenemases
in the Asia-Pacific area. The 13 patients with XDRAb were in
four ICUs and three wards. An SICU appeared to be the
original source of the outbreak, because the first XDRAb
was cultured from the index patient who was recently
transferred from this unit and because this unit had the
greatest number of cases. All 32 XDRAb clinical isolates
from these 13 patients belonged to one pulsotype, indi-
cating clonal spread as the mode of transmission. The
OXA-51 carbapenemases, which are intrinsic enzymes in
A baumannii, have weak carbapenemase activity in vitro
Figure 2. Cases of extensively drug-resistant Acinetobacter baumannii infection or colonization in the outbreak from January to
December 2006. ICUsZ intensive care unitdmedical ICU 1, medical ICU 2, cardiac ICU, neurological ICU, cardiovascular surgical
ICU, and neurosurgical ICU; SICUZ surgical intensive care unit; wards: respiratory care center and other wards.
212 W.-R. Lin et al.and a controversial role in imipenem resistance [31]. When
ISAba1 (which contains a promoter) precedes OXA-51,
greater expression of beta-lactamase occurs [27]. OXA-72
belongs to the OXA-24 group of carbapenem-hydrolyzing
Class D b-lactamases [26]. The OXA-72 gene was first
identified in A baumannii in Thailand in 2004 [32]. However,
there are limited clinical reports of A baumannii producing
OXA-72 carbapenemase [33e35]. Our results, together with
another report in a different southern Taiwan regional
hospital, indicate that the emergence of OXA-72 carbape-
nemaseeproducing A baumannii is a serious concern in
southern Taiwan [33].
Two sequential outbreaks by OXA-58- or OXA-72-
producing MDRAb occurred in an ICU in France, which was
the first documented outbreak of OXA-72-carrying strain in
the world [35]. This MDRAb outbreak was limited to only
one ward, and contact barrier measures could not control
the sequential outbreak because of its environmental
persistence. Our surveillance investigation found XDRAb on
patients’ bodies, in their hospital environments, and on
equipments. Our initial disinfection protocol was inade-
quate, as indicated by the positive culture from the
control panel surface of an ECG monitor in SICU after an
XDRAb-colonized patient had just been transferred from
this unit. Transmission may have been through contact with
this EKG monitor, although XDRAb was not isolated from the
patient subsequently admitted to the same SICU bed. A
previous report suggested transient hand carriage as
a mode of transmission [9]. However, we did not culture
any XDRAb from the hands of our medical personnel caring
for these patients. A previous study suggested that
patients, not the environment, are the main reservoirs of A
baumannii [36]. Considering that Case 2 was hospitalized
without overlapping with other patients, we suspected that
the environment reservoir from Case 4 contributed to his
colonization, because the same clone was confirmed by
PFGE. Although colonization in the environment dis-
appeared after disinfection, A baumannii on patients’
bodies could be responsible for pathogen spread with
patient’s transference. This forced us to implement private
room/space isolation until three consecutive cultures were
negative for XDRAb. There have been previous reports of
hospitals with MDRAb/XDRAb outbreaks in multiple ICUs
over the course of more than 1 year [37e40]. The presentstudy is one of several to report rapid containment of
XDRAb without the closure of the ICU, even though we did
not find the vehicle or personnel responsible for trans-
mission [41e43].
Tigecycline has been reported to have excellent in vitro
activity against XDRAb [44]. However, we found that the
MIC of tigecycline was around 3e6 mg/mL for 28 of the 32
clinical isolatesdhigher than the Food and Drug Adminis-
tration’s definition of susceptibility for Enterobacteriaceae
(MIC 2 mg/mL; Food and Drug Administration, 2005) [29]
and the interpretation criteria of British Society of Antimi-
crobial Chemotherapy (tigecycline susceptible and resistant
A baumannii, 1 mg/mL and >2 mg/mL, respectively).
Although Clinical and Laboratory Standards Institute inter-
pretation criteria are still unavailable, we believe that
careful tigecycline usage for such XDRAb infections is war-
ranted. On the other hand, the MICs of polymyxin B were
lower than 1 mg/mL in all of our 32 clinical isolates. Colistin
also remains a treatment option for A baumannii infection,
despite its potential nephrotoxicity and neurotoxicity [45].
The mortality rates associated with MDRAb have been
reported to be high [8,46]. In Spain, the mortality rate of A
baumanniieinfected patients (27%) was higher than that of
patients with colonization (11%) [12]. A previous study in
Taiwan reported the mortality rate of XDRAb infection to be
38.6% [47]. In the present study, the crude mortality rate
was 61.5% (8 of 13), and the mortality rate of infected
patients (four of five, 80%) was higher than that of colo-
nized patients (four of eight, 50%). The attributable
mortality rate of our patients was 30%. The high crude
mortality rate of our patients may be attributed to the
severity of the underlying conditions, according to their
high APACHE II scores.
There have been previous reports of rapid control of
MDRAb or pan-drug-resistant A baumannii without ICU
closure, when there was early recognition of colonized
patients or an outbreak within a single ICU [9,48,49].
Valencia et al. [43] described the effective control of an
outbreak in two ICUs at a university hospital in Spain, and
emphasized the importance of a multicomponent inter-
vention program. In our case, the outbreak was hospital-
wide and involved seven units. We also implemented
multiple infection control measures, including an intensive
educational program, private room or space isolation for
Acinetobacter baumannii with OXA-72 outbreak 213each patient, strict contact precautions, daily environ-
mental sodium hypochlorite disinfection, ethanol disinfec-
tion of equipment surfaces, and weekly culture follow-ups.
During the outbreak, we did not limit the usage of carba-
penems and did not close any hospital unit. Daily cleansing
with room-dedicated tools and sodium hypochlorite or
detergent may contain the spread of the outbreak path-
ogen. Our successful experience may mandate that infec-
tion control measures should be implemented until there
are three successive negative cultures of a previous colo-
nization site [28]. Sporadic cases of different clones were
found in different wards in the subsequent months; no
limitation of meropenem use or transference of XDRAb
cases between long-term care facilities and hospitals might
have contributed to these.
In conclusion, we reported the first hospital-wide
outbreak in the Asia-Pacific region, caused by the spread of
XDRAb, carrying the OXA-72 gene and ISAba1 preceding
OXA-51-like gene. Prolonged colonization of patients’
bodies and/or failure to adequately perform equipment
disinfection was responsible for transmission. Imple-
mentation of infection control education, private room
isolation with strict barrier precaution, and environment
cleansing can halt transmission without the closure of any
hospital units.
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